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Abstract—In the electrical grid, the distribution system is the
most vulnerable to severe weather events. Well-placed and coor-
dinated upgrades, such as the combination of microgrids, system
hardening and additional line redundancy, can greatly reduce the
number of electrical outages during extreme events. Indeed, it
has been suggested that resilience is one of the primary benefits
of networked microgrids. We formulate a resilient distribution
grid design problem as a two-stage stochastic program and
make use of decomposition-based heuristic algorithms to scale
to problems of practical size. We demonstrate the feasibility
of a resilient distribution design tool on a model of an actual
distribution network. We vary the study parameters, i.e., the
capital cost of microgrid generation relative to system hardening
and target system resilience metrics, and find regions in this
parametric space corresponding to different distribution system
architectures, such as individual microgrids, hardened networks,
and a transition region that suggests the benefits of microgrids
networked via hardened circuit segments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hurricane Sandy demonstrated shortcomings in the re-
silience of the North American power grid. Resilience is
defined as the ability to operate the grid reliably under disaster
conditions. Such disasters include earthquakes, tornadoes, ice
storms, tsunamis, and wildfires [1]. The transmission network
is generally quite resilient because of redundancy from meshed
lines and generation reserves. In contrast, the distribution grid
is much less resilient. It is estimated that 80% of all outages
originate at the distribution level [2]. This resilience is lower
mainly because the networks are typically operated in a radial
configuration, the components are more susceptible to damage,
and there is little controllable generation in such networks [3].
Hurricane Sandy caused prolonged outages for consumer,
commercial, industrial and public loads alike. In response, the
US Department of Energy has identified electric distribution
grid resilience under severe weather as a research area to
pursue, with the objective of improving resilience through
advanced technologies such as microgrids, and has recognized
the need for design tools that include resilience metrics [4].
Microgrids are collections of co-located generation and loads
that are capable of appearing to the main electrical grid
as a single controllable load or generator, and which can
be disconnected to operate as standalone grids [5]. Multiple
options are available to improve resilience in distribution
systems, including improved vegetation management, physical
reinforcement of overhead structures, and addition of new lines
and switching to increase circuit redundancy. Other potential
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options include reconfiguration, spare component stockpiling,
improved scheduling of line crew dispatch, and installation of
microgrids at critical customer locations [1], [3], [5].
Several studies have investigated using microgrids to supply
critical loads during extended outages on distribution systems
[6]–[10]. However, the cost of installing microgrids at all
critical loads is prohibitive. We propose that microgrids exploit
existing or upgraded network infrastructure and use switching
to connect microgrids to each other or to other critical loads
via hardened overhead or underground lines [11], [12]. Such
a design philosophy takes advantage of the economies of
scale and load diversity that make the bulk power grid cost-
effective and more resilient than existing distribution grid
design paradigms [13].
This manuscript describes a resilient design software tool
(RDT) to determine an optimal design of distribution system
upgrades combined with system operations to enable meeting
resilience performance targets during extreme events. In our
previous work [14], the approach was applied to small test
systems using very simplified representations of power flow
physics which neglected voltages, losses and reactive flows.
In the current manuscript, the design tool is extended to
use the linearized approximation of unbalanced three-phase
power flow and is applied to a very large model of an actual
distribution network.
To address this problem, we use a stochastic programming
approach [12], [14] that requires the upgraded distribution
network to meet minimum resilience requirements over many
samples of widespread network damage corresponding to an
extreme weather event. The formulation and algorithms for
expanding and hardening distribution networks for resilience
are similar to approaches used for transmission networks [15];
however, distribution systems present unique challenges. The
first is that distribution networks are typically operated in a
radial fashion. In the worst case, enforcing this topological
constraint requires enumerating all cycles (loops) in the net-
work and eliminating them systematically—an NP-complete
problem [16]. In the literature of distribution system expansion
planning, researchers have proposed various methods based
on flow formulations to enforce radial requirements on small-
scale, single-phase networks [17]. However, it is known in
the optimization literature that flow-based formulations are
computationally inefficient when compared with cut-based
formulations [18]. Thus, in this paper, we extend the latter to
enforce radial operations in three-phase, large-scale networks.
Second, it is challenging to handle the non-convex power flows
of unbalanced multi-phase distribution networks in conjunc-
tion with topology design options. For a given radial topology,
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2a number of relaxations and linear approximation methods
have been proposed in the literature to make the nonconvex
power flow equations tractable [19]–[22]. Here, for unbalanced
radial networks, we employ the linear approximation presented
in [21], [22] but extend the method to handle the line on/off
constraints via disjunctions. Further, we verify the quality of
the solutions obtained with approximations using OpenDSS
[23], a comprehensive distribution system simulation tool, and
demonstrate that the solutions are physically valid.
Literature Review Recently, [24] addressed the problem of
placing microgrids for optimal restoration by topology re-
configuration using a Viterbi algorithm. Their approach is a
heuristic-based method that is limited to balanced systems and
was demonstrated on small-scale networks (up to 69 buses).
In a closely related paper [25], a method was developed to
design resilient distribution systems by multiple microgrid
formations (up to 615 buses). Their work focused on topology
re-configuration of grids with balanced “Lin-Dist” power flow
models and do not consider upgrade options considered in this
paper. Further, to enforce topology requirements, they consider
the single-commodity flow formulation, which can have weak
lower bounds [18]. Related approaches such as [3], [26] use
a defender-attacker-defender (DAD) model that is suited to
finding a small set of critical upgrades that enable resilience
to targeted attacks. In principle, the DAD approach can be
used for widespread extreme weather event damage, but, in
practice, the computational complexity of a DAD approach
grows quickly with the number of allowable failed components
and is often intractable for our network design problem. To
summarize, though there has been a great deal of interest in
resilient design of distribution systems, there has not been
much focus on upgrading existing large-scale grids subject to
natural disasters with practical design options as the respective
mathematical formulation of this problem crosses the frontiers
of tractability. Hence, in this paper, we address this issue by
applying various state-of-the-art optimization techniques.
This rest of this manuscript is structured as follows: Section
II describes the design criteria used as inputs to the resilient
design problem, the fragility model used to generate sets of
line outages based on a disaster scenario and the optimization
problem formulation for resilient design. Section III describes
the computer implementation of the resilient design tool and
the case study systems it is applied to. Section IV presents
results in terms of solutions produced by the RDT tool on
the case study systems and variation in results by varying
the user input parameters (as the trade-off between favoring
construction of microgrids vs. construction of new lines).
Section V presents conclusions and directions for future work.
II. NOMENCLATURE
Note that complex quantities (variables and constants) are
denoted in bold. Given any two complex numbers z1 and z2,
z1 ≥ z2 implies <(z1) ≥ <(z2) and =(z1) ≥ =(z2).
Parameters
N set of nodes (buses).
E set of edges (lines and transformers).
Pi set of phases allowed to consume or inject power at
bus i.
Pij set of phases for the line (i, j).
L set of all loads.
K set of all critical loads.
G set of existing and candidate microgrids.
S set of disaster scenarios.
Ds set of edges that are inoperable during s ∈ S.
C set of sets of nodes that includes a cycle.
S¯dl,k complex power demand in kVA for load on phase k
of load l.
S¯kij line capacity in kVA between bus i and bus j on phase
k.
λ fraction of critical load power that must be served.
γ fraction of total load power that must be served.
S¯gl,k generation capacity on phase k of microgrid l in kVA.
βij parameter for controlling how much variation in flow
between the phases is allowed.
Rk1k2ij resistance in Ω between phases k1 and k2 of line (i, j).
Xk1k2ij reactance in Ω between phases k1 and k2 of line (i, j).
Vmax maximum magnitude-squared voltage in kV.
Vmin minimum magnitude-squared voltage in kV.
M valid constant for disabling voltage constraints on
nonexistent or open line (i, j).
cij cost in $ to build line (i, j); 0 if line already exists.
ψij cost in $ to harden line (i, j).
αl cost in $ to build microgrid l.
N performance period of a microgrid in years.
η depreciation rate of a microgrid.
r yearly revenue from operating a microgrid per kVA
of installed capacity.
Sk,s,lij,0 complex power point used to inner approximate ther-
mal constraint l on phase k of line (i, j) during disaster
s.
Variables
Sdsi,k load delivered at bus i on phase k during disaster s.
ysl determines if the lth load is served or not during
disaster s.
Sgsi,k complex power generated at bus i on phase k during
disaster s.
Sk,sij P
k,s
ij + iQ
k,s
ij : complex power flow on phase k of line
(i, j) during disaster s.
esij determines if line (i, j) is used during disaster s.
esij,0 determines if flow exists on line (i, j) from j to i
during disaster s.
esij,1 determines if flow exists on line (i, j) from i to j
during disaster s.
bij determines if line (i, j) is built.
hij determines if line (i, j) is hardened.
ul determines if generator l is constructed.
hsij determines if line (i, j) is hardened during disaster s.
b¯sij determines if at least one edge (i, j) is used during
disaster s.
V si,k magnitude-squared of voltage on phase k in kV at
node i during disaster s.
3III. FORMULATION AND ALGORITHMS
The high-level objective of the resilient design problem
is to select a set of network upgrades that will reduce the
maximum number of outages during an extreme event. This
paper considers severe ice and wind storms. The objective
selects the least expensive combination of possible upgrade
options for a feeder, consisting of (i) adding new lines,
(ii) hardening lines and (iii) adding microgrids that allows
the feeder to meet resilience requirements. The resilience
requirements are defined over a set of disaster scenarios. Each
disaster scenario describes the power system after the event
has disabled lines or other equipment. The scenarios are the
result of a stochastic calculation, in this case sampling from a
probability distribution of pole failure due to an ice and wind
storm [27].
A. Metrics
The design criteria for resilient design are (i) constraints
for load served and (ii) costs for the upgrades. The problem
is formulated to upgrade an electrical distribution system to
meet load constraints at a minimal cost. Load constraints
consist of critical load served and noncritical load served.
The load served criteria are defined in terms of the total
power supplied to critical and noncritical loads in each damage
scenario. In a typical design scenario, a large majority (90–
100%) of critical load is selected to be met and 10–50% of
noncritical load is selected to be met. The noncritical load
constraint encourages the optimizer to find a solution that will
help improve resiliency for ordinary customers while ensuring
resilient power for critical loads.
Without loss of generality, new lines are constructed under-
ground at a cost that is linear with respect to their length [28],
[29]. Because the threat model is an ice and wind storm rather
than flooding, new lines are perfectly reliable. See [14] for how
to model situations when new lines are not perfectly reliable.
To ensure that the distribution system is operated radially, new
lines always come with a switch.
This work assumes that hardening lines involves removal
of the existing overhead line and replacement with an un-
derground line. As with new lines, hardened lines are also
perfectly reliable. It is also assumed that the cost of removal
of the overhead line is small compared to that of the new
underground line, so the cost is the same as adding a new
underground line, with the exception that a switch is not added.
It is assumed that the existing feeder has sufficient switches
to always operate in a radial configuration.
Each microgrid consists of generation connected directly to
the critical load it serves plus a transfer switch connecting
the microgrid to the primary system. The cost of installing a
microgrid consists of a fixed cost plus a variable cost that is
linear in the power rating of the microgrid generation. The
fixed cost includes balance-of-system costs, the generator fuel
tank, the transfer switch cost, and the fixed portion of the
generator cost [30].
B. Fragility Model
This study is based on an ice and wind storm [31]. The
failure mode is ice accumulation on conductors and com-
munications cables increasing the cross-sectional area such
that wind pressure on the cables is sufficient to exceed the
breaking strength of the pole. The probability of pole failure
is assumed to be uniform for each pole in the system. This
uniform pole failure model is used to trivially derive a line
failure model in which each overhead line span can fail with
the same probability. Given a failure probability pi for each
pole, the line failure probability, given by 1− (1−pi)2, is the
likelihood of one of the poles supporting a line span failing.
For each line span, a weighted coin is flipped to determine
whether the line fails in a particular disaster scenario. This is
repeated for each disaster scenario.
C. Optimization for Design
The set of scenarios S includes a set of disaster scenarios
and the baseline scenario. Given a scenario s ∈ S, Q(s) in
Eqs. 1 and 2 defines the set of feasible distribution networks.
In this model, Eqs. 1a to 1c model an inner approximation
of the capacity constraint on phase flows based on a polygon
enclosed by eight lines. This approximation is illustrated in
Figure 1. In the figure, the outer circle is the actual line thermal
limit. The inner circle is the thermal limit scaled such that
an octagon whose edges are tangent to the inner circle and
whose vertices intersect the outer circle exists. This octagon
describes a feasible region for Q(s), and the bold points mark
the (P k,s,lij,0 , Q
k,s,l
ij,0 ) points in 1a to 1c. When the line is not
used, the flow is forced to 0 by esij . Eq. 1d forces all phases
to flow in the same direction, an engineering constraint. Eq.
1e states that the flow on a line is 0 when the line is not
available (switch open or not built). Eq. 1f limits the fractional
flow imbalance between the phases to a value smaller than
βij . Imbalance between phases cannot be extreme otherwise
equipment may be damaged. Here, we use βij = 0.15 for
transformers and βij = 1.0 otherwise. Eq. 1g states that the
flow on a line is 0 when the line is damaged and not hardened
(recall that only existing lines are damageable here). Eq. 1h
requires all or none of the load at a bus to be served. Once
again, this is an engineering limitation of most networks. Eq.
1i limits the microgrid generation output by the generation
capacity and caps the generation capacity that can be installed
at each microgrid. Eq. 1j ensures flow balance at the nodes for
all phases. The summation of j ∈ N collects edges oriented
in the “from” direction connecting its neighboring nodes. Eq.
1k eliminates network cycles, forcing a tree or forest topology.
Eq. 1l ensures that a minimum fraction λ of critical load is
served. Eq. 1m ensures that a minimum fraction of non critical
load is served. Eqs. 1l and 1m are the resilience criteria that
must be met by Q(s) and are similar to the n− k−  criteria
of [32]. Eq. 1n states which variables are discrete.
−esij,0Pk,s,lij,0 6 Pk,sij 6 esij,1Pk,s,lij,0 ∀ij ∈ E, k ∈ Pij , l ∈ {3, 7} (1a)
−esij,0Qk,s,lij,0 6 Qk,sij 6 esij,1Qk,s,lij,0 ∀ij ∈ E, k ∈ Pij , l ∈ {1, 5} (1b)
Pk,s,lij,0 P
k,s
ij +Q
k,s,l
ij,0 Q
k,s
ij 6 ((P
k,s,l
ij,0 )
2 + (Qk,s,lij,0 )
2)
∀ij ∈ E, k ∈ Pij , l ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8} (1c)
esij,0 + e
s
ij,1 6 esij ∀ij ∈ E (1d)
4P k,sij (kW)
Qk,sij (kVar)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Thermal Limit
Scaled Thermal Limit
Inner Approximation
Fig. 1: Inner approximation of line thermal limit constraints.
esij = b
s
ij ∀ij /∈ Ds (1e)
∑
k∈Pij
Sk,sij
|Pij |
(1−βij)
6 Sk
′,s
ij 6
∑
k∈Pij
Sk,sij
|Pij |
(1+βij)
∀ij ∈ E, k′ ∈ Pij (1f)
esij = h
s
ij ∀ij ∈ Ds (1g)
Sdsi,k =
∑
l∈Li
S¯dl,ky
s
l ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ Pi (1h)
Sgsi,k 6
∑
l∈Gi
S¯gl,kul ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ Pi (1i)
Sgsi,k −Sdsi,k −
∑
j∈N
Sk,sij = 0 ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ Pi (1j)∑
ij∈E(C)
esij 6 |E(C)| − 1 ∀C ∈ C (1k)∑
i∈N (K),k∈Pi
Sdsi,k > λ
∑
l∈K,k∈Pl
S¯dl,k (1l)∑
i∈N ,k∈Pi
Sdsi,k > γ
∑
l∈L,k∈Pl
S¯dl,k (1m)
bsij , h
s
ij , w
s
ij , e
s
ij , y
s
l , ul ∈ {0, 1} (1n)
Eqs. 2a to 2e define the linearized voltage drops across lines
where the variables V si,k model the voltage magnitude squared
on phase k of node i under scenario s [21]. Eq. 2f defines the
allowable voltage range at each phase.
Z¯ ij = Zije
i2pi/3;
¯
Z ij = Zije
−i2pi/3,where,
Z¯ ij = R¯ij + iX¯ij ,
¯
Z ij =
¯
Rij + i
¯
Xij (2a)
M = Vmax − Vmin ∀i ∈ N (2b)
−M(1− esij) ≤ V sj,a − V si,a + 2(Raaij Pa,sij +Xaaij Qa,sij
+ R¯abij P
b,s
ij + X¯
ab
ij P
b,s
ij + ¯
Racij P
c,s
ij + ¯
Xacij Q
c,s
ij )
≤M(1− esij) ∀i ∈ N (2c)
−M(1− esij) ≤ V sj,b − V si,b + 2(¯R
ba
ij P
a,s
ij + ¯
Xbaij Q
a,s
ij
+RbbijP
b,s
ij +X
bb
ij P
b,s
ij + R¯
bc
ijP
c,s
ij + X¯
bc
ij Q
c,s
ij )
≤M(1− esij) ∀i ∈ N (2d)
−M(1− esij) ≤ V sj,c − V si,c + 2(R¯caij Pa,sij + X¯caij Qa,sij
+
¯
RcbijP
b,s
ij + ¯
Xcbij P
b,s
ij +R
cc
ijP
c,s
ij +X
cc
ij Q
c,s
ij )
≤M(1− esij) ∀i ∈ N (2e)
Vmin ≤ V si,k ≤ Vmax ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ Pi (2f)
The cycle constraint of Eq. 1k is implemented as Eqs. 3a
to 3b to reduce the combinatorial growth of constraints.
∑
ij∈E(C)
(b¯sij) 6 |E(C)| − 1 ∀C ∈ C (3a)
bsij 6 b¯sij ∀ij ∈ E (3b)
The number of cycles in the graph is significantly reduced by
collecting each line between nodes into a single edge. A set
of binary variables for the edges of the corresponding single-
edge graph is introduced to enumerate the possible cycles in
that graph (Eq. 3a). Eq. 3b links the artificial cycle variables
with the line and switch variables.
For each s ∈ S, Q(s) is the set of feasible networks. The
optimal network upgrade is the minimum cost design that
satisfies Q(s) (Eqs. 4a to 4e).
min
∑
ij∈E
(cijbij + ψijhij) +
∑
l∈G
αlul (4a)
s.t.
bsij 6 bij ∀ij ∈ E, s ∈ S (4b)
hsij = hij ∀ij ∈ E, s ∈ S (4c)
bij , hij , ul ∈ {0, 1} ∀ij ∈ E, l ∈ G (4d)
(bsij , h
s
ij , ul) ∈ Q(s) ∀s ∈ S (4e)
Eq. 4a minimizes the cost of constructing new lines, hardening
existing lines, and installing microgrids. The microgrids have
fixed sizes and the cost of each microgrid is split into a fixed
installation cost and a cost based on its capacity. Eqs. 4b
through 4e link the first stage and second stage variables
(Q(s)). The inequality in Eqs. 4b allows new lines to be
switched. Eq. 4e states that the vector of continuous and
discrete variables (esij , y
s
l , ul, h
s
ij) is a feasible network for
scenario s. Note that bsij = 1 for all existing lines in the
network. Similarly, hsij = 0 for all candidate new lines.
The problem is solved using scenario-based decomposition
(SBD) [14]. SBD solves the mixed-integer network upgrade
problem for the base case and a single scenario and then
evaluates the designed network on the remaining scenarios to
verify whether it is feasible. If the designed network is not
feasible on any one of the remaining disaster scenarios, one
of the infeasible scenarios is added to the upgrade problem
and the process is repeated until feasibility is reached. SBD
exploits the property of the problem that once the network is
designed, the solutions for each scenario are independent of
each other. A heuristic variable neighborhood search (VNS) is
also applied to reduce computation time. VNS is used in the
mixed-integer programs constructed by SBD. VNS reduces the
number of binary variables in the upgrade problem by fixing
a subset of them based on their values resulting from a linear
programming relaxation of the problem [33].
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
The case studies in this paper are based on two feeders
from a distribution system in the northeast United States that
are relatively compact. Each feeder is served by a different
5substation, and the feeders are meshed so that they can be
backfed from substations (networked microgrids) on adjacent
feeders.
A. Implementation
All results are based on a C++ implementation using
CPLEX 12.6.2 as the native mixed-integer linear programming
solver. All studies were carried out on a server with 64 GB of
memory and two 2.6 GHz Intel Xeon Processor E5-2660 v3
processors, where 32 of 40 available threads were used. The
number of usable threads was limited by the CPLEX license.
B. Case Study Systems
Three case studies are considered here. The first two case
studies consider each feeder independently. The third case
study combines the two feeders. The combined case study
focuses on the advantages of meshing systems as networked
microgrids. Table I summarizes the salient characteristics of
the two feeders, which are illustrated in Fig. 2. The utility sys-
tems are unmodified with the exception that shunt capacitances
are not included.
Case Study 1 focuses on the smaller of the two feeders.
The feeder consists of two three-phase trunks connected to
the substation by an underground line. It feeds a mix of
mostly overhead and underground single-phase laterals with
occasional three-phase laterals. The feeder in Case Study 1
serves a relatively small number of critical loads, including a
mall that serves as an emergency shelter, a gas station near an
interstate exit, and a small grocery store.
Case Study 2 considers the larger of the two feeders. The
critical loads this feeder serves consist of one cluster of three
grocery stores and three pharmacies distributed throughout the
feeder. The feeder in Case Study 2 has a long looping overhead
three-phase trunk connected to a second main trunk following
a major road. As in the feeder in Case Study 1, it serves a mix
of mostly overhead and underground single-phase laterals.
Case Study 1
Case Study 2
Fig. 2: Case Study 1 and Case Study 2 feeder.
Table II summarizes the upgrade options for the three case
studies. Locations where microgrids can be built are limited
to the critical load locations. In Fig. 2, line segments that
TABLE I: Case Study System Properties
Parameter Case Study 1 Case Study 2
Number of Buses 271 945
Number of Lines 281 940
Total Number of Loads 125 333
Total Load Power 5.50 MW 7.64 MW
Number of Critical Loads 3 6
Total Critical Load Power 359 kW 972 kW
Approximate Span East-West 1.5 km 2.1 km
Approximate Span North-South 1.2 km 2.3 km
TABLE II: Problem Setup Properties
Parameter Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 1 + 2
Microgrids 3 6 9
Candidate Lines 6 6 12
Upgradeable Lines 148 462 610
can be hardened via undergrounding are highlighted in green.
These portions correspond to segments on three-phase trunks
or segments that could form part of an alternate path to supply
critical loads. Candidate new lines are indicated with violet
dashed lines. Only a small number of these are present, and
they are placed only if they are well suited to provide alternate
paths of power between a substation and critical loads or
between critical loads.
The criteria and costs used in the case studies are summa-
rized in Table III. The critical load–served requirements for
each case study are as follows:
1) Case Study 1: 98%
2) Case Study 2: 90%
3) Case Study 1 + 2: 90%
The amount of noncritical load that must be served varies
between 10 and 50%. Depending on the amount of noncritical
load, the optimizer will select a solution that can also provide
power to noncritical loads (low amount of noncritical load
required to be served) or a solution that adds additional
hardening specifically to provide power to a sufficient amount
of noncritical loads (high amount of noncritical load required
to be served).
Each potential microgrid location has the choice of 10
possible microgrids sized between 100 KW and 1 MW in
100 KW increments. As described earlier, the cost of adding
microgrids consists of a fixed portion and a capacity-based
portion that is linear in the power rating. For the purposes of
this study, we perform a sensitivity analysis on the capacity-
based portion of the cost. In practice, this cost (or benefit)
could be calculated based on net-present-value (NPV) over
the performance period of the microgrid. For example, given
a microgrid power rating of
∑
k∈Pl S¯
g
l,k kW, yearly revenue
in dollars per kVA r, depreciation rate η, and a performance
period of N years, the capacity cost of a microgrid at node i
could be calculated as an NPV:
ζl,k =
N∑
n=0
(
1
1 + η
)n
rS¯gl,k. (5)
The cost of new lines and upgrading lines remains constant
across all design cases studied. Lastly, each of 50 damage
6TABLE III: Constant Parameters for All Case Studies
Parameter Value
Phase Variation 15%
Critical Load Served 90%, 98%
Noncritical Load Served 10%, 20%, ... 50%
Microgrid Sizing Increment1 100 kW
Microgrid Fixed Cost $25k
Maximum Microgrid Size 1 MW
Microgrid Variable Cost2 $100/kW, $200/kW, ... $500/kW
Line Hardening Cost $1M/mile
New (Underground) Cost $1M/mile + $25k
Damage Probability per Line 20%
Number of Damage Scenarios 50
scenarios is constructed by damaging lines with a 20% proba-
bility. Note that on average 20% of lines will be damaged but
that the actual number will vary across damage scenarios.
For Case Study 1 and Case Study 2, we perform a sensitivity
analysis on the noncritical load served and microgrid capacity
cost parameters. For Case Study 1, 5 values are used for each
parameter, giving a total of 25 design cases. For Case Study
2, 9 values are used for each parameter, giving a total of 81
design cases. For the combined Case Study 1 + 2 feeder, a
single design case is discussed.
V. RESULTS
Results from the sensitivity analysis for Case Study 1 are
shown in Fig. 3. The center contour plot depicts the difference
between the amount of microgrid generation installed in tens
of kW and the total number of hardened/new lines. As the
amount of noncritical load required to be served increases,
the optimizer chooses to harden the feeder trunk. As the
cost of installing a microgrid increases, the optimizer chooses
to add hardened paths to critical loads instead of installing
microgrids. The overall trend from the bottom left to the top
right increasingly favors lines over microgrids. The critical
load closest to the substation never receives a microgrid
because it is connected via a three-phase underground line to
the substation and is never damaged under the studied threat
scenario. In case (b) at the top right of the figure, one critical
load receives neither a microgrid nor a hardened path. The
result is reasonable given that this critical load comprises a
relatively small portion of the total critical load, i.e., the 98%
critical load served criteria is not violated.
Results from the sensitivity analysis for Case Study 2 are
displayed in Fig. 4. The behavior in this case is a little more
complicated. The number of new and hardened lines increases
as the noncritical load served increases and the microgrid
variable cost increases. However, total microgrid power rating
becomes more sensitive with respect to microgrid variable
cost as the amount of noncritical load served increases. In
case (a), inexpensive microgrid generation is used to provide
resilient power to noncritical loads instead of installing new or
hardened lines, as shown in case (b). In all cases, the critical
loads in the top left of the network figure are connected via
hardened lines as a collection of networked microgrids. In
1Power is given per phase.
2Costs are given in terms of dollars per average power per phase.
TABLE IV: Comparison of Calculation Times for Feeders
Item Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 1 + 2
Avg. Time 2.91 min 1.12 h 2.64 h
Std. Dev. 1.97 min 1.09 h —
Worst-Case Time 6.32 min 3.25 h —
No. of Replicates 81 25 1
TABLE V: Comparison of Costs for Feeders
Item Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 1 + 2
Cost $224k $1.72M $720k
New Lines 0 2 1
Hardened Lines 12 82 24
No. of Gens 1 1 3
Gen Power (kW) 100 100 300
TABLE VI: Validation of Voltage Constraints with Unbalanced
Distribution System Solver
Case Study Lowest Voltage (pu) Highest Voltage (pu)
Case Study 1 1.019 1.030
Case Study 2 0.993 1.031
Case Study 1 + 2 1.026 1.030
case (b), the optimizer chooses to build new lines to provide
resilient power to noncritical loads and the critical load at the
bottom right of the network diagram.
Results for the Case Study 1 + 2 meshed system are
illustrated in Fig. 5 using the following parameters:
1) Microgrid variable cost: $500/kW
2) Noncritical load served: 33%
This solution has a smaller set of networked microgrids
shown at the top left of the figure. Also of interest is that a
new line is constructed to increase meshing of the two feeders,
allowing a critical load in Case Study 2 to be supplied resilient
power from the Case Study 1 substation with only a small
amount of hardening of the Case Study 1 feeder trunk.
The three combinations of feeders are compared in Tables
IV and V. For this comparison, the previous parameters of
$500/kW microgrid cost and 33% noncritical load served are
used. Additionally, 90% of critical load is served for all combi-
nations. This table supports one of the key contributions of this
manuscript: A demonstration on utility data that networked
microgrids can bring strong resilience benefits. The cost of
making each microgrid resilient independently is roughly $2M.
However, meshing the feeders and allowing them to support
each other results in a resilient system that costs roughly one
third of the independent solutions.
Results from OpenDSS validating that voltage limits are
met on the designed solution are presented in Table VI.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we developed a model for assessing the value
of introducing networked microgrids to improve distribution
system resiliency. We applied the approach on two distribution
feeders from a northeastern United States electric utility. Under
a selection of upgrade options, approximations of power flow
physics, an ice/wind fragility model and heuristic search, our
approach was demonstrated to scale to problems of practical
size.
7(a) $100/kW, 50% load
(c) $100/kW, 10% load
(b) $500/kW, 50% load
(d) $500/kW, 10% load
c d
ba
Fig. 3: Case Study 1 microgrid construction metric and solutions.
(a) $100/kW, 50% load
(c) $100/kW, 10% load
(b) $500/kW, 50% load
(d) $500/kW, 10% load
a
c d
b
Fig. 4: Case Study 2 microgrid construction metric and solutions.
The results of this study indicate that there is good mo-
tivation for networking microgrids for resiliency needs. In
particular, the value of networked microgrids is apparent when
there are clusters of critical loads that are distant from a
substation and the cost of hardening lines is relatively higher
than the cost of installing microgrids. It is important to note
that when hardening is less expensive, this may reduce the
benefit of using networked microgrids. More importantly,
perhaps, we also showed the cost of upgrading the resilience
of two or more feeders together can be significantly less costly
than upgrading the feeder resilience individually.
There remain a number of interesting future directions.
For example, resilient distribution system design remains a
computationally difficult problem. Thus, there is room to
develop algorithms that improve the performance and scal-
ability of the approach that was discussed here. For example,
future work could aggregate lines into upgrade sets where all
lines in the set share a single decision variable to harden or
build. Similarly, we could allow nonradial operation during
extreme events which would cut down on the cycle constraint
8Fig. 5: Case Study 2 + Case Study 1 solution.
enumeration. There are also a number of natural parallel
computing approaches that could exploit the decomposable
structure of this problem. Finally, communication and control
are increasingly becoming a part of distribution system design
and these will play a critical role in the future resilience of dis-
tribution feeders. Thus, there is a need for model development
that includes communication pathways and controls.
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